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The Role of the Industrial Sector in Korea's Transition to
Economic Maturity
Gustav Ranis*
Any really useful examination of the role of Korea's industrial sector
during the recent past, with an eye on the future, requires placing that role
in the context of the overall pattern of Korean development, while keeping a
sensitive eye on the historical time dimension.

The analysis, moreover, must

recognize that Korea belongs to a particular family of developing countries,
which realization affects in a very marked fashion both the theoretically "ideal"
role to be played by the industrial sector in such a context as well as any
judgment about its actual performance in this particular case.
Korea belongs to the group of small, therefore open, labor surplus
dualistic economies, characterized by relative natural resources poverty and
abundance of unskilled labor at the outset.

When contrasted with the other

types or sub-families of developing countries, e.g. large labor surplus dualis•
tic countries like India, where trade plays a relatively minor role, or land
surplus countries like Nigeria, where natural resources are relatively abundant,
this LDC family is subject to a number of specifiable initial conditions and

idealized rules of growth over time which need to be understood

il

the actual

pattern of Korean industrial development is to be usefully contrasted with it.
In Section I we will briefly define the "ideal" growth pattern for the open

~he author is currently engaged in a broader related research effort,
supported by the Agency for International Development, also involving
Profe·ssor John Fei of Yale and ·Professors Sung Hwan Jo of Korea and Chi-Mu
Huang of Taiwan. He wishes to acknowledge their substantial contributions to
this paper, which should be viewed as preliminary and tentative in nature,
especially with respect to the precision of the empirical data presented.

-2dualistic labor surplus economy, based on a number of growth theoretic prin
ciples which will themselves not be dealt with in any detail in the course of
this paper.

1

As we then turn to a review of the actual Korean experience relative
to this ideal, we will find it useful to contrast Korean performance with that
of t'wo other countries be longing to the same family, i.e. Japan, historically,
and (especially) Taiwan in the post-war period.

Such contrast of actual be•

-li,vior in this type of an eco·nomy, including that of the industrial sector,
will permit us a much sharper focus on the Korean case.

Sections II and III

are devoted to this comparison1 both as to the initial conditions and the
similarities and differences of the transition process in the two countries.
Finally, in Section IV, we attempt to pull together the implications of our
analysis for further research and policy.

1
The main structural characteristics of the labor surplus open dualistic economy may be summarized as follovis:
(a)

the coexistence of a relatively large agricultural subsistence
sector with a relatively small non-agricultura l or commercialized
A distinguishing characteristic of the

sector at the outset.

agricultural sector is that workers are compensated according to
institutional or familial rules above their marginal productivity.
(This sector includes not only subsistence agriculture per se
but also substantia 1

11

soft" portions of the non-agricultura l sector

1
See, however, Development of the Labor Surplus Economy: Theory and
Policy (with J.C.H. Fei), Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, 1964; and "Development
11
and Employment in the Open Dualistic Economy, (with J.C.H. Fei), paper pre
sented to the Conference on Manpower Problems in East and Southeast Asia,
Singapore, May 22-28, 1971.

-3located in urban areas.)

The "hard" non-agricultural or commer..

cialized sector is characterized by the prevalence of the well•
known nee-classical conditions for the compensation of the labor
force, i.e. people are compensated according to their marginal
product.

(This sector includes most of industry, portions of the

service sector, including public utilities, transportation and
financial intermediaries.)
(b)

A land/labor ratio in agriculture sufficiently unfavorable so that

diminishing returns have brought the marginal product of labor to
a low level (below the institutional wage);

(c)

Population pressures at the margin tending to render the unfavorable
natural resource base even less favorable over time.

(This popu•

lation growth may be viewed as adding to the pool of redundant or
disguisedly unemployed.);
(d)

An overall shortage of capital for investment, especially in the
non-agricultural sector, plus fairly low levels of technology
change in both sectors;

(e)

An economy, which may be characterized as basically agrarian in
character, which trades with the rest of the world mainly via the
exportation of traditional raw materials in exchange for a com•
bination of investment goods (to permit the further exploration of
the primary raw material export base) and a limited volume of con•
sumer goods (to satisfy the entrepreneurial elite or the workers
being gradually pulled out of the subsistence· and into the export
oriented agricultural sector).
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The basic problem in such an economy, if it is to move in transition to a state
1
of economic maturity as defined by Kuznets, is to gradually shift its center
of gravity from low productivity subsistence to the higher productivity non
subsistence or commercialized activities.

This shift of the center of gravity,

resulting from labor reallocation in excess of population growth, is, of course,
only symptomatic, i.e. it represents the top of an iceberg which encompasses
the successful performance of the entire system.

The rest of the iceberg is

descriptive of the real resources functions which each of the major production
sectors and the foreign sector must play if the system as a whole is to success•
fully escape its initial underdeveloped condition and throw off consistent in
creases in per capita income without major negative side effects in terms of
income distribution or unemployment.
If we wish to trace the workings of an LDC of the Korean type, over
time, we know that the basic resources function of the preponderant agricultural
sector is to release labor and to provide food, raw materials, and saving to the
growing non-agricultura l sector, either directly or through exports.

Adequate

performance here requires that agriculture be able to continuously generate a
surplus, that is output in excess of the consumption requirements of those
left in agriculture, and moreover, that this surplus can be preserved and
channeled into productive activity in non-agriculture .

The basic role of the

non-agricultur al sector, which we are mainly concerned with here, is the selec
tion of the appropriate technology to provide employment opportunities which
productively absorb the released labor force as well as to generate the addi
tional fuel for the further development of the economy, again either directly
or through the trade mechanism.
1

s. Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure, and Spread,
New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966.
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It should be clear in this context that the open dualistic economy's
total saving fund is composed of two kinds of domestic contributions, indus•
trial profits and agricultural surplus, plus any surplus available from abroad,
i.e. foreign capital.

The total domestic saving fund must then be allocated,

along with entrepreneurial energies, to the two sectors so as to increase agri•
cultural productivity, on the one hand, thus freeing labor and yielding more
agricultural surpluses, and to increase industrial labor productivity, on the
other, thus creating a demand for the released labor and yielding new indus•
trial profits for reinvestment.

At the same time, given the consumer pre

ferences of the typica 1 worker in both sectors, the output generated in each
must be such as to prevent either a shortage of food or of industrial goods,
as would be indicated by a marked change in the intersectoral terms of trade.
Allocation decisions taking into account both capital accumulation and tech
nological change in each sector must thus proceed in a more or less balanced
fashion so as to avoid the over-expansion of either sector in the course of
labor reallocation and growth.

In the open economy context the tyranny of

domestic balanced growth in consumer goods is much less severe as domestic out
put imbalances can be corrected through trade.
Once such a process of synchronized growth requiring a balanced allo
cation of entrepreneurial energies as well as saving fund has proceeded long
enough for the entire disguised unemployed labor force to have been "mopped up,"
a mature economy pattern following neoclassical growth rules emerges.

This re

sults from the rise of the marginal product of workers to the level of the in
stitutional wage and the persistent growth in per capita income over time.
The chances that such

II

graduation" wi 11, in fact, occur, and the speed

with which it can be reached, however, has to do not only with the effort put
in, but also with the aforementioned initial resource endowment, i.e. the

-6extent and size of the reserve army of the unemployed, the initial relative
size of the two sectors, the size and quality of the productivity enhancing
forces in both sectors, the precise commodity characteristics of the development
process, and the quality of developmental financing.

If the various links

operate over time so as to create adequate productivity change in each sector, contin•
uous

labor reallocation, and clearance in output markets without marked

changes in the inter-sectoral terms of trade, the process is a smooth one.
Inevitable imbalances, :i..eo too much productivity increase in one sector or
another, leading to a temporary deterioration of the intersectoral terms of
trade for or against one sector and/or an excess release or a shortage of
workers, may cause difficulties in the short term, but the long run pattern is
clear.
When we look at this transition to economic maturity as a process of
several decades, we are, moreover} able, in this idealized case, to differentiate
between an early and late sub-phase of the transition.

The first sub-phase may

be called the "first restructuring" of a previously agrarian economy.

This is

characterized by the so-called import substitution syndrome of policies which most
LDC's,

including the particular family to which Korea belongs, followed in

the post-World War II period.

As such a society emerges from a more or less

stagnant colonial situation, it demands a drastic reallocation of its resources.
Typically this is effected through assertion of government control over tradi
tional export proceeds iu order to prevent their continued reinvestment for
the exclusive benefit of that same sector (or repatriation abread).

Instead

the attempt is made to channel such resources into domestic non-agriculture,
i.e. industry, overheads and services.

Previously imported consumer goods

are increasingly produced by the new and growing domestic industrial sector,

-7while efforts are simultaneously made to increase the interaction between the
domestic food producing agricultural and non-agricultural sectors in a mutually
reinforcing fashion.

This import substitution policy syndrome usually includes

not only direct controls over foreign exchange to permit reallocation to
socially desirable sectors but often substantial government deficit financing
accompanied by inflation and an increasingly overvalued exchange rate.

Through

out the economy, but especially in the allocation of such critical resources
as credit, foreign exchange, cement, steel, etc., quantitative restrictions
coupled with administered prices are preferred--all in an effort to channel
resources towards the import substituting industries and their ancillary over
head requirements.
The operation of this system and its deleterious effects on output
generation, employment and other performance indicators is by now fairly well
understood.

But what is perhaps being lost sight of in the present mood of

condemnation of these policies is that such aberrations from efficiency may be
a necessary first step taken by newly independent governments in interposing
themselves on behalf of the national development effort.

Prices traditionally

serve as stimulants and propellants; but if there exist institutional impedi
ments, a shortage of overheads or of entrepreneurs, planners or policy makers
may well have to set prices in such a way as to provide larger than normal
profits to offset larger than normal risks, for a time.
The problem really is how much import substitution, and for how long.
Once entrepreneurial capacity is enhanced via learning-by-doing processes, in
frastructure is created and institutions are gradually transformed in directions
which accommodate or facilitate change, such extra price margins or windfall
profits would be expected to decline and disappear.

The economy is then ready
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to enter its second sub-phase of transition which we may call export substitu
tion.

While under import substitution public and large-scale private enter

prise are the main beneficiaries, in response to the actual or assumed shortage
of domestic entrepreneurship, once the hothouse temperature is lowered, a re
structuring of the main relative prices, including the exchange rate and the
interest rate, should take place, especially if agriculturists as well as
medium and small scale industrialists are to be fully mobilized in the develop
ment effort.

This cannot be accomplished either through direct ownership

(except in the case of a socialist system) or through direct horizontal con
trols across the board, since it is physically impossible for government to
reach the millions of dispersed economic agents effectively.

Thus, as the

economy typically moves into its export substitution sub-phase, the government's
catalytic instead of its directly allocative role comes to the fore.
Returning to the idealized development path for our type of LDC, we would
thus expect the initial pattern of traditional raw material and agricultural ex
ports which finance the import substitution sub-phase to give way as changes in
the underlying comparative advantage position of the economy occur in the course
of transition.

This change from land to labor-intensive production and exports

is likely to be quite drastic, governed by relative productivity increases in
the two domestic sectors and the domestic versus international terms of trade.
It is ultimately likely to lead to the net importation of agricultural goods
in the natural resources poor type of LDC--although it is difficult to predict
~~

when this is likely to occur.

It should be noted that this reversal

of comparative advantage from the net export to the net import of primary
products is quite separate from the switch from import substitution to export
substitution which will occur in the course of the transition.

Export substitution,

r

for example, (as in the case of Taiwan) may well include new labor intensive
agricultural products as well as new labor intensive industrial products.
Development in the open dualistic labor surplus economy will thus in
evitably be characterized by a concentration on the exportation of first land
intensive, then labor, and finally skill and capital intensive goods in order
to acquire the needed capital and raw materials.

This holds for Japan histori

cally as well as for Korea and Taiwan, if we take a long enough historical view..
But the question before us at the moment is how the growth experience of such
economies should be analyzed in the shorter term as they move towards this re
latively inevitable long run pattern.

In other words, while the progression in

the idealized case is from land intensive exports, in the agrarian import sub
stitution sub-phase, to labor intensive exports and from there to skill and
capital intensive exports during export substitution, differences will emerge
in the course of this transition as between countries even of this particular
type.

It is these differences which are instructive, not only from the point

of view of growth theory generally, but also from the point of view of relevant
analysis and policy respecting any particular member of the group.

As we will

try to demonstrate, our understanding of the industrial sector's role in Korean
modernization is considerably advanced by comparison with the historical ex
perience of Japan and that of Taiwan in recent decades.
II

As we have already noted, while large labor surplus dualistic economies
must follow a relatively balanced intersectoral growth path, a small country of
this type can utilize the opportunity of trade to follow a more unbalanced
path.

All three members of the family under discussion here share the basically

poor natural resources base and therefore ~Jtimatelv will probably need to
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import food.

The question before us, however, is whether or not existing re

serves of productivity in agriculture are harnessed during the shorter term
transition period en route to the fina 1 commercialization or "turning point, 11
when the economy enters into mature growth.

Substantial increases in agricul

tural productivity, especially during the import substitution sub-phase, can
make the task much easier.

Once such productivity increase peters out, as it

inevitably will at some point, agriculture will have played its historical role,
in terms of its contribution to foreign exchange resources, the economy's
saving fund, and the continued availability of cheap labor.
Taking briefly the Japanese historical case first, we know that its
import substitution sub-phase, which began roughly with the Meiji Restoration
in 1868, was a relatively brief and mild one by contemporary standards.

For

one, possible excesses of protectionism vis-a-vis domestic industry were curbed
by the extra-territoriality provisions of the unequal treaty systems imposed

on Japan by her trading partners at the end of the Seclusion Period.

For

another, Hjalmar Schacht's primer on interventionism in the foreign exchange
and other markets had not yet been written.

Japan's decision, around 1890,

to sell a substantial volume of her directly productive facilities initially
in government hands

more or less signalled the end of two decades of strongly

paternalistic and directly interventionist action by the government.

The

switch from import to export substitution, indexed by the switch from raH silk
to silk yarn exports, can be placed just before the turn of the century, by
which time the main or primary consumer goods import substitution process had
been completed.

During that period, moreover, we witness a major agricultural revolution
in progress which has been much commented upon in the literature"

1

As a conse

quence, we observe only a slight deterioration of the industrial sector's terms
of trade during the 19th century, but, because of the continued rapid indus
trialization which took place, followed by a petering out of the agricultural
revolution, such deterioration did continue until about 1900.

At about that

point Japan turned from being a net exporter of primary materials and food to
a net importer, and the terms of trade between agriculture and industry were
kept from deteriorating furthero

This food, incidentally, was procured mainly

from Japan I s colonies in Taiwan and Koreae
Thanks to the burst in agricultcral productivity, moreover, and given
the unlimited supply of labor condition, the agricultural real wage did not in
crease very markedly during this early period, i.e. 1.7 percent annually between
1880 and 1908 while the industrial real wage increased by 2.2 percent.

This is

in marked contrast to wage increases of close to 4 percent for both sectors
after World War I.

In other words, the abtlity to, first, generate sustained

domestic agricultural productivity increase, and, then, to import the necessary
food and raw materials from her colonies perm:l.tted Japan to maintain a relatively
modest increase in both agricultural and industrial wages while she was rapidly
reallocating her labor force from agriculture to non-agriculture.
As

a consequence of this moderate wage increase in both sectors, with

industrial wages tied to those in agriculture, we also witness a much less
pronounced industrial capital deepening process during the pre-World War I
1
see, for example, Bruce F., Johnston, "Agricultural Productivity and
Economic Development of Japan," Jotir~f Political Economy, VII, 2 (Novem
ber 1947); G. Ranis, "Financing Economic Development, 11 Economic History Review,
March 1959; and Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, 11 The Role of Agriculture
in Modern Japanese Economic Development, 11 ~Economic ~elopment and Cultural
Change, IX, 1, Part 2 (October 1960).
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period than in the post-war.

In other words, both industrial technology as

well as output mixes were relatively labor-using especially during the export
substitution phase of Japanese development.

Once the reserve army of the unem

ployed and underemployed had been absorbed, labor saving innovations were adopted
in the post-World War I period, in response to the changing factor endowment.
In summary, Japan first switched from import substitution to export
substitution (let us call that the "switching point") around 1890.

About 10

years later she became a net food importer to keep the process of labor reallo·
cation going and the industrial wage from rising "prematurely."

Finally, around

1920 she reached the commercialization or turning point, defined as the terminal
·
.
o f h er 1a b or surp 1us cond.1t1on.
tion

With respect to Korea and Taiwan, the common assumption is that both
of these economies have been traveling down the same historical path previously
trod by Japan, with Korea perhaps a few years behind Taiwan.

By general agree

ment, Taiwan exhausted her primary (consumer goods) import substitution possi
Government policy changes, including devaluation, import

bilities around 1959.

liberalization and interest rate reform helped usher in the export substitution
phase around that time.

Once this second restructuring had substantially re

duced the major distortions in relative prices of the previous import substitu•
tion sub-phase, the industrial sector was increasingly marked by major shifts
in output mix towards labor intensive industrial exports, and increasingly labor
using technologies for given output mixes, especially in textiles, electronics
and food processing.

Facilitated by the establishment of the Koahsiung Export

1
Ryoshin Minami, "Further Considerations on the Turning Point in the
Japanese Economy," Parts I and II (Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Vol. 10,
No. 2, February 1970 and Vol. 11, No. 1, June 1970) has challenged this as the
appropriate date for the turning point, but we see no need to go into this
controversy in the context of the present paper.
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Processing Zone, a dramatic expansion of labor intensive industrial exports
took place.
In 1952 rice and sugar constituted 78 percent of Taiwan's export earnings.

By 1969 this had shrunk to 4.8 percent.

On the other hand, non-traditional agri

cultural products including fresh and canned fruits and vegetables grew from
negligible amounts to 10 percent of the total; but, most impressively, labor
intensive manufactured goods including textiles, plywood products, and elec
tronics grew from 5 percent to close to 70 percent of total exports.
dimensions

The full

of this structural change are recognized when we note that total

export earnings themselves were rising at rates of 30 percent on the average
during the 60s.
Within the industrial sector, substantial capital saving or labor-saving
innovations were in evidence, especially in fabricating as opposed to continuous
processing industries.

For example, one multi-national corporation engaged in

plastics production reported that its capital-labor ratio was about the same
as in the U.S. in its continuous processes, but only about one-half of that of
the American plant in fabrication.

In electronics assembly also the amount of

labor used is at least 50 percent greater than in parent company plants in the

u.s.

Not only are capital-labor ratios lower, but they have been falling during

the export substitution sub-phase.

For example, the largest electronics factory

in Taiwan has experienced an increase in her capital stock by 9 times along
with an increase in employment by 16 times, between 1965 and 1969.

The overall

conclusion derived from plant visits is that, during this export substitution
phase, the closer the production process to the finished product stage, i.e.
the further removed from backward linkages, the greater are the possibilities
for efficient labor using innovations.

-14As a consequence of all this, industrial labor absorption which grew
at rates of 3 percent annually during the import substitution period, between
1952 and 1959 (see Table 1), accelerated to 8.1 percent annually in the 60s.
If we divide non-agriculture into Kuznets' Mand S sectors,

1

the rate of labor

absorption grew from fi.• 8 percent annually in the 50s to 7. 5 percent in the 60s,
for the M sector; and from 3.2 percent to 6.5 percent for the same periods in
the S sector.

Equally significant is the fact that once the various reforms

which facilitated the move to export substitution had been completed, this
trend seems to have accelerated, i.e. during

1

64-'69 the rates of labor absorp

tion were 8. 7 percent for the M sector and 7. 2 percent for the S sector, respec
tively.

By the end of the decade, the "turning point" was apparently reached

as a labor shortage set in and real wages began to rise markedly.
When we next turn to contemporary Korea, all the signs indicate a
similar path as that followed by Taiwan, but with a slight delay.

Devaluation

in 1964 and a major interest rate reform in 1965 laid the basis here as well
for the shift from import substitution to export substitution and for major
changes in technology as well as output mix.

Here also even more dramatic in

creases in total export volume (by close to 40 percent annually) were accom
panied by major structural changes in the post-1962 export substitution sub
phase.

Here also labor based light manufacturing, including plywood, electronics,

cotton textiles and footwear accounted for close to 80 percent of total exports
by 1968.
Once again, partly with the help of tariff free zones, capital stretching
adaptations of imported technology can be cited, especially in textiles,
1
These data are from Harry Oshima, "EKperience of Labour Absorption in
Postwar Taiwan," a paper presented to the Conference on Manpower Problems in
East and Southeast Asia in Singapore, May 22-28, 1971.
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electronics and plywood production.

In cotton weaving, for example, one Korean

girl mans 3 looms as contrasted with 4 in Japan; in spinning the contrast is
between 600 and 900 spindles.

Moreover, Korean machinery is run for 3 eight

hour shifts daily as contrasted with only 2 such shifts in Japan.

In the pro

duction of plywood what at first appear as production processes very similar
to those carried on in the

u.s.,

in fact, turn out to be quite flexible--in

terestingly •enough mainly because of the greater machine speed combined with
much more labor-intensive repair methods used.

In the United States, defective

pieces of lumber are cut out automatically by machine and discarded.

In Japan,

defective pieces of lumber are cut out by hand and the section is discarded.
In Korea, defective sections are cut out by hand, the scraps saved, and the
defect plugged manually.

In this fashion lower quality raw material can be

upgraded to an equivalent quality output through the application of cheap labor.
Overall we found twice as many workers per unit of capital equipment in Korea,
i.e. 123 workers are engaged per equivalent capital production line as con
trasted with 72 in Japan; moreover, a Korean line is worked a 22-hour day as
compared to 20 in Japan.

At the same time between 10 and 15 percent more

workers are engaged in inspection, repair and maintenance of both materials
in process and the machinery in place.

Finally, in electronics, machine

related labor-using innovations and adaptations are again prominent.

In tran

sistor assembly operations, for instance, given wage rates lOX lcwer than equiv
alent operators get in the U.S. (for the same firm), the machinery is run at
physical full capacity, i.e. six days, three shifts a day which is 20 percent
above the U.S. equivalent.

The difference in speed of assembly on identical

equipment can yield a 30 percent differential in output (from 68 units per
machine hour to 85) and in a die mounting process it rises to more than 100
percent (from 113 units per hour to 240)0

Greater speeds of operation, either
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due to faster machine or operator pacing, are here once again accompanied by
putting additional girls into more intensive testing, inspection, maintenance
and repair efforts than is encountered in Japan or the U.S.
As a consequence of this combination of changes in output mix and tech

oology, Korea's industrial employment has been increasing in a rather sustained
fashion during the 50s and 60s (see Table 2) even though the rates have not
been quite as high as in Taiwan and the acceleration in the export substitu
tion phase has not been as marked.

More recently sustained wage increases

have been noted and the current consensus is that Korea has reached the turning
point and is entering into a labor shortage situation.
All in all, we would thus seem to have before us, in the cases of both
Taiwan and Korea, two very similar contemporary success cases, both following
rather closely the described idealized pattern in the open dualistic labor sur
plus economy.

A rapid reallocation of labor, accompanied by a burst of export•

oriented industrial activities, high overall growth rates, facilitated by
government policies permitting the switch from import to export substitution,
and culminating in a labor shortage at the end of the decade--these are the
common features.

However, as we shall see in a moment, this apparent virtually

complete symmetry is deceptive and does not stand up to closer examinationo
Moreover, the divergence in the pattern of development followed by the two
countries is significant and will help us to focus constructively on current
problems facing Korea's policy makers.

ill
For purposes of eliciting a more detailed useful comparison between
these two economies in transition, let us first examine the initial conditions

-17for Taiwan in 1952-54 and for Korea in 1955-57,

1

and then contrast these with

1968-69 which is the common "terminal" period, i.e. as far as our statistics
take us.
The first point to note is that, in spite of their shared Japanese
colonial heritage, Taiwan and Korea, had in fact, at the outset, a very different
agricultura l infrastruct ure at their command.

The much more favorable initial

agricultura l infrastruct ure in Taiwan is reflected in a much higher agricultura l
labor productivit y, as shown in row 1, Table

a. 2

In fact, Korea's labor produc

tivity at the beginning of the transiticn was cnly about 60 percent of that of
Taiwan (see column 4).

As

to the significanc e of this difference in terms of

the "ideal" transition case, a higher level of productivit y, as in the case of
Taiwan, permits a society to have a higher consumption standard, and/or to utilize
the agricultura l surplus to allocate more people out of agriculture , and/or to
help finance the industrial sector by exporting agricultura l products and thus
enhance the economy's capacity to import capital goods.

As

row 2 of Table 3 in•

dicates, the per capita consumption level of agricultura l goods at the initial
point was about the same in the two countries in spite of the substantial ly
higher level of labor productivit y in Taiwan.

As

we can see from rows 3 and 4,

Taiwan instead used the differentia l to allocate a much larger fraction of its
population out of agriculture and to support the transition process through
trade.

It is rather startling to note that the percentage of the total labor

force already allocated to non-agricul ture in Taiwan at the beginning was more
than twice that of Korea (45 percent versus 22 percent).

In other words,· a larger

l.rhese base periods, coming a few years after the move from the Chinese
Mainland, in the first case, and after the Korean War in the second, are con
sidered appropriate initial post-war years.
2
This has much to do with the Japanese effort to bring irrigation to
Taiwan in order to assure the success of the cash crop, sugar, while being
relatively less concerned with agricultura l investments in Korea.

proportion of the total population had to be kept in agriculture in Korea in
the early 50s in order to feed the total population because of her relative
lower level of agricultural productivity.

An even more startling contrast

emerges from the data in row 4, which indicates that, while Korea was hardly
able to do any net exporting of agricultural goods at that point, Taiwan was
exporting at the rate of almost $14.00 per capital.
This marked initial difference in agricultural productivity thus al
ready provides a very broad hint as to very different roles played by the two
sectors in the two countries under discussion.

In the case of Taiwan, the sur

plus of agricultural goods already available at the outset could immediately
be turned into a major contributor to the growth of the industrial sector
during the import substitution sub•phase--both directly and indirectly (through
trade).

Moreover, this favorable initial infrastructural base could be built

on to ensure the continued expansion of agricultural productivity, over time,
during the transition process.

In the case of Korea, not only did the agricul

tural sector provide hardly any exportable surplus to begin with but it remained
relatively stagnant throughout the period under examination.

This, as we will

see, put a much heavier burden on the industrial sector and on foreign aid to
finance the total development effort.
In continuing our comparative examination of the initial conditions
in the two economies, we should also note that, as far as the industrial sector
is concerned, which is our main focus of interest here, the non-agricultural
real wage is substantially higher in Taiwan in the initial period (see row 6a,
Table 3).

In two predominantly agricultural economies, we can expect, and do

in fact obtain, approximately the same parity in agricultural productivity
(row 1), real wage (row 6) and per capita GDP (row 9).

The higher industrial

real wage in Taiwan would normally lead us to expect a higher capital-labor
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ratio, and a higher average product of labor thereo

We find, however, (see

rows 7 and 8) that, in fact, it is Korea which has a higher capital intensity
and a higher productivity of induatrial laborn

This combination can only mean

that there is a different "average" technology in use in the two countries,
i.e. that Korea at the very outset is employing a more capital-using technology
and/or output mix than Taiwan in her industrial sector.

This again, as we

shall see, has important implications for the transition paths the two economies
have followed to dateo
Other consequences flowing from the interrelated differences in the
level of the non-agricultura 1 wage (ro\J 6a)~~and the per capita GDP (row 9)
are differences in the industrial consumption standard and in the volume and
structure of international trade.

With respect to the industrial consumption

standard, first, we should note that, since the internal terms of trade in the
two countries are about the same (row 11) and since the agricultural real wage
(row 6b) may be thought of as institutionally determined in the labor surplus
economy, the fact that the two countries consume about the same amount of agri
cultural goods per head means that Korea initially consumes less industrial
goods on a per capita basis (row 10).
As far as the volume of trade is concerned; the initially higher indus•
trial wage and per capita GDP levels in Taiwan, given the basic similarity of
the natural resources endowment., would lead one to expect a higher volume of
trade in Taiwan.

This is, in fact borne out by the information in row 12

showing total exports as a fraction of GDP, which indicates Korea's initial ex
ternal orientation to be only one-thir( of Taiwan 1 so
With respect to the structure of trade, given the relativ~ly more ad
vanced state of agricultural development in Taiwan, the exports of Taiwan are
initially dominated by traditional agricultural goods_:vhile, in the case of
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Korea, from the very beginning, her relatively small volume of exports is com
posed of a mixture of traditional agricultural (including mining) and non
agricultural goods.
On the import side, the imports of both countries are, of course, dominated
increasingly from the beginning, by development-oriented capital goods and raw
materials.

But we should again note a major difference, i.e. Taiwan's higher

per capita income and requirements for a much larger volume of industrial con
sumer goods imports (row 13)--also consequently much larger scope for primary
import substitution.

Tai'tvan' s agricultural exports were able to make a sub

stantial contribution to the procurement of these imports and to the import
substitution process (additional capital goods and raw materials) required to
rep lace them over time.
The initial import substitution sub-phase of transition growth in Taiwan
thus runs close to the "ideal" version.

During this early period agricultural

exports provide the main fuel for industrialization in terms of the enhanced
capacity to import capital goods and raw materials.

There thus exists a parti

cular pattern of triangularism through which the agricultural sector produces
an exportable surplus ·which, in turn, provides the import capacity for the
needed industrial goods.

Moreover, the incomes generated in the agricultural

sector by these same agricultural exports provide a market for these same indue
trial consumer goods, first imported and later, as domestic capacity is built
up, increasingly produced at home.

Korea, in sharp contrast, was forced very

early to become a net importer of food and to deploy foreign exchange obtained
elsewhere, mainly from abroad, for its purchase.

The stage is thus set for a

much more bi-lateral interaction between the industrial sector and the foreign
sector, as agriculture is relatively stagnant.

It is the traditional industrial

sector vJhich contributes to the small exportable surp.lus from the beginning and
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helps finance the (more limited) import substitutio n process, and it is the
growing non-traditi onal industrial sector which is then saddled with the responsi
bility of diverting a portion of its import capacity to the filling of the
food gap--a problem to which we shall be returning below.
Given the marked differences in initial structure which have thus
I
become very apparent, let us now examine the two countries growth per forrnance

during the transition period itself with the same care.

This can be done most

readily, in a comparative static sense, by examining the two countries' com
parative structure in the terminal periodo

In both countries, to take the

similaritie s first, a marked shift of the cent2r of gravity from the agricul•
tural to the non-agricul tural sector must be noted (see Table 3, row 3) as between
the initial and terminal periods.

This major reallocatio n of labor in excess of

population growth, and as a consequ~nce of industrializ atio::;. has by now led to
a shift of more than SO percent of the population out of 1;tgriculture , and in fact
to an absolute decline of the agricultura l population in both countries.
Secondly, we may note that both countries, under the pressure of the un
limited supply of labor condition, did not increase their per capita consumption
standard for food very much (see row 2).

This means that saving propensitie s

increased substantial ly in both cases (see row 14) during the transition period.
In Taiwan this moreover means that per capita agricultura l exports could be sus
tained at about the same level ($13 or $14 per capita) in spite of population
growth and a much smaller fraction of the total population in agriculture .

In

Korea the agricultura l consumption standard was maintained only via increasing
food imports.
The main point of contrast tb2n is that Taiwan built on her initially
favorable agricultura l infrastructu re with policies suppc-rting the continuous
expansion of agricultura l labor productivit y, gr.owing at 6 percent annually.

At

the end of the decade the agricultura i produ,:::tivit y parity hcd declined from .60
to .38.

This meant that, even though Taiwan remains a natural resources poor country
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porter of agricultural goods.

Her ability, in spite of poµulation growth and

labor reallocation, to continue to supply a large volume of traditional and
non-traditional labor intensive agricultural exports substantially lessened
the pressure on her industrial sector to fuel the entire development program.
Korea's initial agricultural infrastructure combined with the policies
in vogue during the transition combined to yield a continuously relatively
lagging agriculture

(see row 1), coupled with rapid industrialization and

labor reallocation.

This combination inevitably led to the early emergence

of an import food gap and put an extra heavy burden on the industrial sector
as this gap had to be filled (to maintain the agricultural consumption standard),
even if it meant the diversion of import capacity from other uses.

Agriculture,

instead of contributing to import capacity and the financing of the import
substitution effort thus became a drag on it.
Seen in another light, the contrast can be summarized by looking at the
saving performance once again, this time disaggregated by sector of origin
(see rows 16-18).

It should be noted (row 16) that, while agricultural saving

contributed the lion 1 s portion to a (low) domestic saving performance in
Korea in the initial period (24.8 percent) this had fallen to 2.9 percent by
the late 60s.

Thus, in spite of the remarkable turn-around in the contribu

tion of industrial saving reflected in row 17, the direct consequence of agri
cultural stagnation was a heavy reliance on foreign capital inflows.

In con

trast, Taiwan witnessed a balanced expansion of the contribution of agricul•
tural and non-agricultural saving (from 18 percent to 21.8 percent and from
40 percent to 68.l percent,

respectively) accompanied by a marked diminution

of the contribution of foreign saving (row 18), from 48 percent to 10.5
percent.
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pare the cumulative contribution of the three types of saving to total invest
ment over the entire transition period in the two countries (see Table 4-).
While agricultural saving contributed almost 26 percent of the total invest
ment fund in Taiwan, this figure was only 9.4 percent in Korea.

Even more

startling is the fact that foreign capital (aid plus private investment) had
to finance 73 percent of Ko~eais total investment program--as opposed to only
5. 5 percent in Taiwan.
Turning now to the industrial sector, let us recall that once import
substitution policies had done their job, ice. the creation of the infrastruc
ture and the maturation of industrial entrepreneurs, and once changes in that
policy package were in a positio~ to facilitate the move into the export sub
stitution sub-phase, we could expect, and found, the combination of surplus
labor and maturing entrepreneurs to yield a sustained increase in labor inten
sive industrial exports in both countries,

While both countries increased the

size and, given that domestic markets remained constrained by the unlimited
supply of labor condition, the external orientation of their industrial sectors,
Taiwan was, moreover, able to continue on her initially more labor intensive
technology path.

Korea, on the other hand, maintained relatively higher capi

tal intensity in her industrial sector even though, by international standards,
her technological flexibility was quite remarkableo

While our data don't per

mit us to more than assert the point, we, moreover, suspect that the divergence
here became more marked after 1968 when Korea appears to have reversed some
of her earlier reforms and liberalization policies and to have pushed harder
in the direction of the more capital intensive backward linkage and capital
goods types of import substitution and export promotion.

In other words,

even though the remarkable success story of industrial output ~xpansion coupled
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tinues to hold, a closer examination here also shows problems in the Korean
case which have come to the fore increasingly of late and will become even
more noticeable in the future in the absence of a reversal in policy.
To be a bit more specific, by 1960 the import substitution phase had
done its historical, and perhaps inevitable, job in Taiwan, that is (1) it
permitted the maturation of domestic entrepreneurs; (2) permitted the expansion
of agricultural infrastructure and agricultural productivity enabling the in
dustrial sector to acquire labor at fairly stab le real wages for labor intensive
industrial production and export; and (3) gradually exhausted the domestic mar•
ket for industrial consumer goods, naturally leading to the need for a more
external industrial orientation.

The move from import substitution to export

substitution was thus the natural consequence of growth, with maturing entre
preneurs taking advantage of the cheap indigenous labor supply and the
accommodating policy changes of government.
In Korea, on the other hand, since there was relatively little consumer
goods import substitution from the beginning, the switch to export substitution
was not so much from land-based agricultural exports to labor-based industrial
exports as that it represented an acceleration of the non-agricultural export
phenomenon.

As

capital resources were being augmented more through foreign

aid and industrial reinvestment than through the participation of agriculture.)
the same entrepreneurial maturation process, assisted by government policy reorientation, led to a shift not so much from primary to industrial exports,
as from traditional to non-traditional industrial exports.

Given the absence

of a solid and expanding agricultural base and without the contribution of
agricultural exports, the pressure on import capacity and the balance of

-25payments became much more severe.

It should be noted that Taiwan has recently

become a net exporter of capital, while Korea remains a substantial importer,
even though there has been a shift from aid to private investment.

!Y
Summary and Conclusions
As we look at the development process in the open labor surplus type
of economy, let us recall that we have identified three meaningful turning
points during the transition.

First, there is the point at which import sub

stitution, fuelled mainly by traditional land-based exports, gives way to ex
port substitution, fuelled by non-traditional labor-based exports (we have
called this the "switching point"); second, there is the point at which the
economy given its basically unfavorable natural resource endowment, becomes
a net food importer; and third there is the so-called commercialization point
when the basic conditions of labor surplus give way to labor scarcity.

In

the case of Japan, as we have seen, agriculture played its idealized historical
role during the import substitution phase and the switching point was reached
around 1890; Japan became a net food importer around the turn of the century;
and the commercialization point was probably reached after World War I.

In

the case of Taiwan, import substitution gave way to export substitution around
1959.

The productivity of the agricultural sector was such that Taiwan's in

dustrialization could be fuelled in substantial part, directly or indirectly,
by agricultural surpluses.

But while Taiwan remains a net exporter of food

to this day, the agricultural productivity increase is now finally running
out of steam and we may expect Tai'tvan to become a food importer at some point
in the future.

The commercialization point marking the end of her labor sur

plus condition occurred around 19706
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fulfilled its historical mission.

Consequently throughout the import substitu

tion phase, while industrial entrepreneurial maturation did take place, the
essential fuel for the export substitution phase to follow was never generated.
Consequently, a tremendous burden fell upon the export oriented industrial
sector.

Not only did it have to pay for its own continued expansion, but also

for the food imports which began almost immediately a'nd have grown prodigiously
since.

Net imports of food have risen from negligible amounts in the fifties

to about $250-300 million annually at present.

Food deficits per head have

risen from about $1 in 1953 to almost $9·currently.
It is this unusual burden on the industrial sector which has to "pull"
a dragging agricultural sector along with it, rather than getting the benefit
of an additional "pushu from it, which has in turn led to certain distortions
in the industrial growth pattern which most observers of the Korean scene are
increasingly aware of.

For e,rnmp le, the industrial export drive, which in re•

cent years has probably gone beyond the point warranted by long-run comparative
advantage and culminated in negative value added in some sub-sectors, can be
laid at the doorstep of these exclusive and heavy demands made on the sector.
While a disaggregation of industry is necessary to fully document our asser
tion1 it is my impression that, given the relatively small scope for consumer
goods imp~rt substitution, backward linkage import substitution cum export
promotion which is both capital and technology intensive, were resorted to
increasingly, especially after 1968, ahead of the economy's resource endowment.
As has been clearly pointed out in recent policy discussion, the imported raw
material component of exports as well as the capital intensity of exports has
1such research is currently under way.
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Imports of export-destined raw materials have increased from

$7 million in 1964 to $297 million in 1969.

The production of intermediate

goods, which used to be around 15 percent of total industrial output, is now
approaching 20 percent; durable consumer goods production has increased from
1.8 percent of the total in 1963 to 6 percent in 1963; machinery from 3.9 per
cent to 5 percent.
ther.

By this date these percentages have undoubtedly risen fur

Similar indirect evidence exists on the export side, e.g. intermediate

goods exports have jumped from 3.8 to 801 percent of domestic production.

This

is not to deny that non-durable consumer goods exports have been increasing
even faster, but simply to reassert that a "good thing" may have been taken too
far.
In order to keep the heat on the industrial exporting sector which has
to carry such a heavy burden--for the reasons already referred to--large numbers
of special incentives have been established.

1

This use of incentives for ex

port promotion has been partly a response to an exchange rate which had once
again become increasingly overvalued (at least partially adjusted by the devalua
tion of 1971) but has also been accompanied, especially since 1968, by sub
stantial moves away from liberalization on the import side which is of equal
importance for any efficient export substitution policy package.
In short, the agricultural sector's failure to play out its historical
role to date has, in turn, affected the historical role of industry.

Instead

of moving first to labor intensive, then to skill intensive, and finally to
capital intensive production and exports, Korea has been forced to attempt to
1rhese incl~de tariff reductions and exemptions for raw materials and
capital goods; tax reductions and exemptions from indirect or direct taxes;
raw material import wastage allowances; export/import linkage systems; deposit
rate preferences; preferential interest·rates to industrial exporters; subsidy
of freight and electricity rates for exporters.
This subject is summarized in Kim Hwan Su~"Export Promotion and In
dustrial Incentive Policy in Korea, 11 January 1971 and is the subject of an ex
tensive research effort under the direction of Bela Balassa.
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move directly into at least some fairly technology intensive and capital in
Moreover it has been forced to admit an unusually heavy in

tensive sectors.

flow first of foreign aid, more recently of private foreign capital, to keep
the process going.
In ·sharp contrast to Taiwan, Korea thus became a net food importer in
the late 50s, long before she reached her switching point around 1963.
it is some:\vha t

Moreover,

doubtful that recent wage increases really signal the end of

Korea's labor surplus condition or the advent of the commercial ization point;
rather they may be traceable to a deteriorati on of the industrial sector's
terms of trade as cheap P. L. 480 food imports are no longer completely able
to avoid some signs of a food shortage.

As

labor continues to be pulled out

of a reca lei tr ant agriculture instead of being pushed out by technology change
what looks to this observer like an artificial or perhaps premature labor
shortage is making itself felt.
If the above analysis isn't entirely off the mark it suggests a number
of directions for fuller examination and policy.

Obviously, the possible activa

tion of the still relatively unexplored agricultura l productivit y reserves
would seem to be of the highest order of priority.

lilhile we do not wish to

offer specific armchair solutions, a shift from agricultura l neglect and indus
trial stimulation to a more balanced set of policies seems warranted.
To those who remain skeptical about the inherent capacity of Korean
agriculture to undergo even a mild version of the Green Revolution, one is
tempted to pose the follo't•iing points.

First, given the admittedly inferior

agricultura l infrastructu re left by the Japanese; the efforts by government to
repair that infrastruct ure have clearly not been adequate to date.

By infra-

structure is meant not only irrigation, roads and other physical investments
but the creation of a total environment conducive to productivit y increase.
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For example, it is our distinct impression--though admittedly based on inade
quate research--tha t rura 1 market and credit conditions sti 11 leave much to
be desired.

The marked contrast between the NACF which is basically a multi

purpose agency but mainly se.rving the Government, and Taiwan's Farmers' Asso
ciations, coupled ·with the JCRR structure, which mainly serve as the instrument
of the farmers, is but a case in point.

A second is Korea's agricultural

price policies which are still, in this observer I s view, directed more to
wards income redistribution after the annual production decisions have already
been made rather than towards providing incentives for increased agricultural
output.

Thirdly, the testimony of agronomists and agricultural economists

seems to be largely on the side of the existence of a substantial potential
for future agricultural seed/fertilizer revolutions.
Finally, one should note the contrast between a relatively decentralized
rural-oriented industrial sector (as in historical Japan and Taiwan) and Korea's
urban-oriented counterpart.

This is a subject of some importance not only for

the conventional reasons of reducing industrial capital intensity but also
because it may have substantial dynamic effects on farmers' incentives to
accept new technology.

Historical Japan and, if to a lesser extent, Taiwan,

have been characteriz~d by a good deal of industrial subcontracting, with
medium and small scale firms reaching out into the countryside, while processes
taking advantage of the economies of scale remained mainly in the urban centers.
Korea, on the other hand, is marked by very little "connectivity" between
the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors.

Consequently industrialization

has led to more displacement and less symbiosis between medium and large
scale industry.

This has had the effect of higher import and capital intensi

ties, but also, and perhaps more importantly, adverse effects for agricultural
productivity when the "distance:i between the two sectors is substantia 1 and
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farmers cannot perceive investment opportunities outside of agriculture and
are thus less interested in exploring the risks of new technology.
In brief, one would suggest more government intervention in agriculture
and less on the industrial and trade side.

The recent devaluation points in

that general direction but should be complemented by a return to a larger mea
sure of import liberalization and a dismantling of the various quantitative
controls which give di started signals to the kind of e~~ports which are likely
to be viable and efficient in terms of Korea's current and future capabilities.
This somewhat critical analysis of the Korean development story must, of course,
be viewed in context.

Compared with the performance of most developing countries

over the past two decades, there can be no doubt that the success story label
continues firmly attached.

Korea did achieve a remarkable turn-around from

complete stagnation in the fifties to extremely rapid growth in the sixties-in spite of continuing population pressures on top of an initially unfavorable
land-labor ratio.

Korea has demonstrated impressive flexibility in her tech-

nology, and has been able to drastically restructure her output mixes as a
consequence of maturing industrial entrepreneurs and favorable government
policies as evidenced by the reforms of the early '60s.
But it is also clear to Korea's planners and policy makers as well as
to outside observers that there exist problem areas, with roots in the past,
which must be tackled in the future.

The increasing import intensity of the

industrial exporting sector, the continued heavy reliance on foreign capital,
the growing food gap, are all symptoms of a marked deviation of the Korean
plan from what we have called the idealized pattern for this type of an economy.
If the industrial sector is to play its proper role as a flexible, efficient
and dynamic growth propellant, the needed push from agriculture, as a contributor
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to the saving fund, as an amelior ator of balance of payments pressure s and
as a supplier of relative ly cheap labor for yet some years to come must be
provided .

Once the industr ial sector is relieved of the pressure to run

ever faster in order to pull the rest of the econol.To/ along, its own growth
can be more flexibly in tune with the econol.To/' s changing resource endowment
and help ensure smooth transiti on to modern growth without excessiv e reliance
on foreign capital.
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Table 2
Industrial Labor Absorption:
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Table 3
Kore~~ and Taiwan:

1

Comparative Stru~J;ure aJ}cLPerformance
Initial Period

I

!ndex
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Agricultural labor productivity
Consumption of agricultural goods
per capita
3) Fraction of total labor force in
non-agriculture
!.:.) Agricultural exports per capita
5) Industrial exports per ce.pita
6a) Non-agricultural real wafe
6b' Agricultural real wage
7) Non-agricultural capital/labor ratio
C) Non-agricultural labor productivity
;) Per capita GDP
l(i) Consumption of non-agricultural goods
per capita
11) Internal terms of trade (Pa/P·)
12) External orientation (exforts/GDP)
13) Non-agricultural consumet goods imports
as fraction of total
lt..,) Propensity to save
15) Investment rate
16) Agricultural saving/total investment
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These data are preliminary and subject to revision.
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Table 4
Cumulative Contribution to Investment During Transition
Korea

Taiwan

,-

c s

Agricultural Saving

___!!

l I

9.4%

25.9%

17.5%

68.6%

ls.

Non-agricultural Saving

Foreign Saving

[ .=i
E.. I

--2..

[ I

\

73.1%

5.5%

\,_
I

